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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MISTY DAWN SEGURA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990914-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Appellant/Defendant Misty Segura replies to the state's brief as follows.
Arguments not addressed in this reply brief were either adequately discussed in
Appellant's opening brief or do not merit reply.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Error occurred in failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Misty aided and abetted another in order to convict Misty. That error was
obvious in light of existing case law. Under controlling Utah case law, this error requires
reversal as a matter of law. Moreover, even if this Court were to require prejudice, the
evidence regarding the missing element was controverted; the jury could have believed
that Misty did not aid Chastity. A new trial is therefore required.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. MANIFEST INJUSTICE OCCURRED IN THIS CASE
WHERE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT IT MUST FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
APPELLANT AIDED AND ABETTED ANOTHER IN ORDER TO
CONVICT HER.
A. ERROR OCCURRED IN LIGHT OF LAINE AND OTHER CASES.
The state claims that the trial judge's error in failing to include the aiding and
abetting element in the elements instruction was not reversible error because the
instructions as a whole informed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Misty "solicited], requested], commanded], encourage[d], or intentionally aid[ed]ft
Chastity in order to convict Misty. State's brief at 8-12. A review of the instructions
relied on by the state and collected in its addendum demonstrates, however, that those
instructions do not require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Misty aided
and abetted Chastity, and instead, require only that the jury find that Misty "obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another." R. 36; see Addendum to
state's brief.
The state attempts to distance this case from State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah
1980) so as to avoid the holding in Laine that the failure to instruct the jury that it must
find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt is reversible error. State's brief at
8-9. The state acknowledges that this case is similar to Laine in that an essential element
was not included in the elements instruction. State's brief at 9. It argues, however, that
2

Instruction No. 3 provides an adequate substitute for including the aiding and abetting
element in the elements instruction because Instruction No. 3 tells the jury that the "State
has the burden of proving each of those essential allegations [in the Information] beyond
a reasonable doubt." R. 28; see state's brief at 9.
Contrary to the state's argument, Instruction No. 3 does nothing to inform the jury
that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Misty aided and abetted Chastity in order
to convict Misty. The "essential allegations of the charge contained in the Information"
are not delineated anywhere in the instructions other than in Instruction No. 119 the
elements instruction. Since Instruction No. 11 does not include the aiding and abetting
element, Instruction No. 3fs direction that the jury must find all of the essential allegations
beyond a reasonable doubt does nothing to inform the jury of this missing element.
Moreover, the Information itself, which was not part of the instructions, alleges
that Misty Segura, as a party to the offense, "obtained or exercised unauthorized control
over the motor vehicle of Alamo Rent-A-Car with the purpose to deprive the owner
thereof." R. 2. The Information says nothing about"solicit[ing], request[ing],
command[ing], encouraging], or intentionally aid[ing] another person to engage in
conduct," and therefore Instruction No. 3fs message that the state must prove all of the
essential allegations in the Information tells the jury nothing in regard to the necessity of
finding this element beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict Misty. Because the
instructions as a whole fail to inform the jury that aiding and abetting is an essential
3

allegation, the message in Instruction No. 3 that the jury must find all essential allegations
beyond a reasonable doubt fails to save these instructions.
Moreover, the message in Instruction No. 7 that a person "who directly commits
the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another
person to engage in conduct which constitutes the offense" does not tell the jury that it
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Misty solicited, requested or otherwise aided
and abetted in order to convict her. Given that Instruction No. 7 did not tell the jury that
aiding and abetting was an element, and that it must find that element beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict Misty, the instructions failed the mandate of Lame
that unless the judge instructs the jury as to "what each element is and that each must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt...," reversible error occurs. Laine, 618 P.2d at 35.
This case is remarkably similar to Laine. Both cases involve charges arising from
the theft of a motor vehicle. See Laine, 618 P.2d at 34. In Laine, the elements instruction
omitted the intent element. Id. at 35. A separate instruction informed the jury of "the
intent required for commission of the crime, but [did] not inform the members of the jury
that before returning a verdict of guilty, they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had [that intent]." Id
In the present case, the elements instruction failed to include the actus reus
element-aiding and abetting. Although Instruction No. 7 vaguely referred to that actus
reus, like the instructions in Laine, the present instructions failed to inform the jury that it
4

must find that element beyond a reasonable doubt.
The state misreads Laine when it claims that the decision in that case turned on the
absence of an instruction similar to Instruction No. 3 telling the jury it must find all of the
essential allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. State's brief at 9. Indeed, the decision in
Laine actually was based on a review of the instructions which, while articulating all of
the elements, failed to clarify that intent to permanently deprive was an element which
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Laine, 618 P.2d at 35. The same problem
exists in this case where nothing in the instructions informed the jury that aiding and
abetting was an element it must find beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision in Laine
therefore mandates that the conviction in this case be reversed.
In this case, the jury was given free rein without any guidance as to what it must
find regarding Misty's actions in order to convict her. Indeed, since the jury was never
told that aiding and abetting was an element it must find beyond a reasonable doubt, it
was likewise never informed that aiding and abetting had a specific definition and did not
include M[m]ere presence or even prior knowledge... .ff State v. Labium, 959 P.2d 120,
123 (Utah App. 1998). Instruction No. 7 merely gave the jury "arid, dense statutory
language that the trial judge [did] not relate concretely to the issues in [the] case." State
v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). Reversible error occurred in this case
where the jury was not instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt the most
important element that was at issue in this case.
5

In addition, in the absence of an instruction requiring the jury to find aiding and
abetting beyond a reasonable doubt, the inclusion of Instruction No. 8, telling the jury that
it need not concern itself with the status of Chastity, further compounded the error. Not
only was the jury allowed to convict Misty without ever finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that she "solicited], requested], command[ed], encourag[ed], or intentionally
aid[ed] another, it was also allowed to convict her without finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that anyone committed the theft.
While evidence certainly existed in this case to pursue a theft charge against
Chastity, an issue as to whether she held the intent to permanently deprive, or whether
Misty aided and abetted her in permanently depriving existed. Based on the testimony,
Chastity's request to take the car may well have been interpreted as a request to take it for
a short period of time. The jury needed an accurate instruction as to what it needed to
find regarding Misty's role, which necessarily included a focus on Chastity.
B. THE ERROR WAS OBVIOUS.
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have never required that an error in failing
to instruct a jury on all of the elements must be obvious in order to reverse a case for
manifest injustice when such an error occurs. See discussion on page 21 of Appellant's
opening brief. Even if such an error must be obvious, however, the error in this case
meets that requirement. Indeed, the state's claim that the trial judge's error in failing to
instruct the jury on the actus reus, aiding and abetting was not obvious is specious. See
6

state's brief at 12-13.
Laine, which is almost directly on point, was decided long before this case and
clearly instructs that reversible error occurs when the judge fails to instruct the jury as to
all of the elements it must find beyond a reasonable doubt. See discussion supra at 2, 4.
The missing element in Laine was articulated in a separate instruction, but the Court still
found reversible error because the instructions did not inform the jury that it must find
that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial judge in this case could not
have reasonably believed that a similar error in these instructions was acceptable under
Laine. The state's claim that the error was not obvious because of the teaching in Laine
that the instructions are viewed as a whole fails to consider the entirety of that decision,
and the fact that Laine requires reversal in the present circumstances. See state's brief at
12-13.
Moreover, the state claims that the error was not obvious because State v. Chanev,
1999 UT 309, 989 P.2d 1091, was decided after the trial in this case. Appellant did not
rely on Chanev in support of her claim that the error was obvious. Instead, she relied on
State v. Pacheco. 492 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1972), affdonreh'g. State v. Pacheco. 495 P. 2d
808 (Utah 1972); State v. Pacheco. 495 P.2d 808 (Utah 1972); State v. Scott, 732 P. 2d
117 (Utah 1987); State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191; Laine. 959 P.2d 120 ; and
other cases decided prior to the trial in this case. See e,g. Appellant's opening brief at 22.
While these cases indicate that the jury must be instructed that it must find beyond a
7

reasonable doubt the element of aiding and abetting, the state for the most part ignores
these cases when it argues that the error was not obvious. Contrary to the state's claim,
the error in failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Misty aided and abetted in order to convict her was obvious.
C. THE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL.
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have "consistently held that '[fjailure to
give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under
Rule 19(c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law.'" American Fork v. Cam
970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah
App. 1995) and citing State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah App. 1993)); see also
State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (citing inter alia Laine. 618 P.2d at 35);
State v. Roberts. 711 P. 2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985); State v. Harmon. 712 P.2d 291, 292
(Utah 1986) (per curiam}; State v. Reedv. 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1984). Precedent
from the Utah Supreme Court as well as this Court which has held that reversible error
occurs as a matter of law under our rules of criminal procedure, if not our state due
process clause, therefore requires this Court to reverse Misty's conviction as a matter of
law where the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that it must find the element of aiding
and abetting beyond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, in assessing whether the error requires reversal, Laine again provides
guidance. In Laine. the defendant negotiated the purchase of a new car. Laine. 618 P.2d
8

at 35. After signing the contract, the defendant told the dealership he needed the new car
to drive to his bank which was nearby and that he would get the money and return with it.
Lame, 618 P.2d at 35. He did not return and the dealership reported the car stolen. Id
Eight days after negotiating the contract, the defendant was arrested with the car in
Minnesota. Id Although the evidence in support of the intent to permanently deprive
element was strong, the Court held that the failure to instruct the jury on that element
required reversal. This case likewise requires reversal where the trial judge did not
instruct the jury that it must find an essential element beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to convict Misty.
Since our courts have already decided this issue on state grounds in a way that
departs from the recent federal due process decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1
(1999), the state decisions control and this Court is required to reverse Misty's
conviction. Contrary to the state's suggestion, Misty is not required "to articulate any
reason for departing from the federal harmless-error analysis11 (state's brief at 15) because
controlling Utah case law has already departed from the federal analysis and applies in
this case.
The state suggests that despite the long line of cases from the Utah Supreme Court
as well as this Court which have "consistently held that "[fjailure to give an elements
instruction' requires reversal as a matter of law" (American Fork v. Cam 970 P.2d at
720), Utah law requires a harmless error review when the jury is not instructed on an
9

element. In support of this argument, the state relies on State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d
1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994) and State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35ffi[27-31,392 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3. Neither of these cases present a compelling basis for overruling the rule adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court, consistently followed by both appellate courts and recently
reaffirmed by this Court.
In Stevenson, this Court held that the failure to instruct the jury on the element of
non-marriage in a rape case did not require reversal. Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1291.
Because the non-marriage element was never at issue at trial and "all testimony at trial
clearly and indisputably established that defendant and [the victim] were not married,"
this Court held that manifest injustice did not occur in failing to instruct the jury on that
element. Id. Stevenson presented a unique circumstance where not only was the
evidence that the defendant and victim were not married clear and indisputable, but the
non-marriage element had been deleted from the statute and no longer was included as an
element of the crime when this Court reviewed Stevenson's conviction. Id Given these
unique circumstances, this Court upheld the conviction.
Following Stevenson, in Can;, this Court reiterated the rule that failure to give an
accurate elements instruction requires reversal as a matter of law. Carr, 970 P.2d at 720.
In Carr, the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that one of the elements of lewdness was
the intent to derive sexual gratification. Id Because the instruction did not include this
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element, this Court reversed the conviction as a matter of law without conducting a
review for prejudice. Id
Since the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that failure to accurately
instruct on the elements of a crime is manifest error requiring reversal as a matter of law
and this Court has reiterated that position after issuing the decision in Stevenson,
Stevenson has no controlling authority and does not provide a basis for departing from
Utah Supreme Court holdings. Moreover, even if Stevenson controlled, it would not
apply in this case where the evidence regarding the missing element was not clear and
indisputable, and instead, was controverted. See Appellant's opening brief at 24-9.
The state also suggests that State v. KohL 2000 UT 35,1flf27-31, 392 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3 supports its argument that this Court should conduct a harmless error review rather
than follow Supreme Court precedent that mandates reversal as a matter of law. Kohl
however, does not involve a review for manifest injustice in instructing a jury. Instead,
Kohl analyzes whether an error occurred in imposing the gang enhancement, and if so,
whether that error requires reversal. Because the Court was not reviewing for manifest
injustice in Kohl, the Laine line of cases requiring reversal as a matter of law when the
jury is not instructed on an element were not considered by the Court. In fact, Kohl does
not mention or acknowledge those cases. Because Kohl did not consider whether
manifest injustice occurred in instructing the jury, it cannot be read as overruling the
Laine line of cases.
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Moreover, Kohl involves unique facts where the jury had already found the
element at issue, and is decided on the basis of those unique facts. Kohl 2000 UT 25,
f 29. In Kohl the jury had necessarily found the missing element of in concert activity
with two or more persons when it convicted three co-defendants of committing an
aggravated burglary. Id. The Court indicated that f,[t]he trial court could have properly
instructed the jury that in the event all three defendants were found guilty of the charged
aggravated burglary, the jury must also find that each defendant acted "in concert with
two or more persons' in the commission of the burglary." Kohl 2000 UT 25, ^29
(emphasis and quotations in original). Because the jury found all three co-defendants
guilty, they had necessarily also found that the trio acted in concert, thereby allowing for
imposition of the gang enhancement without retrying the case. In other words, reversal
was not required because the jury had actually made the necessary finding and the court
could therefore impose the gang enhancement as a matter of law. Given the unique
circumstances in Kohl and the Court's failure to address Laine and other controlling case
law, Kohl does not overrule the Laine line of cases. In addition, in the present case, the
unique circumstances of Kohl are not present. Since the jury was not instructed that
aiding and abetting is an element of the crime, let alone given a definition of aiding and
abetting, the jury has not found that Appellant aided and abetted Chastity.
In addition, even if the Neder harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis
applied, a new trial is required in this case. Neder indicates that when the error involves
12

the failure to instruct the jury that it must find an element beyond a reasonable doubt, that
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the evidence on that issue is
uncontroverted. Neder, 527 U.S. at 18. This requirement exists in this context because if
the evidence on the missing element were controverted, the reviewing court would have
to act as "a second jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty." Id at 19. The
United States Supreme Court rejected the notion of a reviewing court acting in this
capacity and was therefore willing to uphold a conviction when the jury was not
instructed on an element only if the evidence was uncontroverted. Id. at 18.
This Court's decision in Stevenson supports the notion that if the failure to instruct
a jury on an element of a crime is reviewed for prejudice, the conviction can be upheld
only if the evidence on that element is uncontroverted. Stevenson, which represents the
only departure in Utah case law from the standard reversal as a matter of law when the
jury is not instructed on an element, upheld the conviction only because the evidence on
the non-marriage element was clear and undisputed. Unless evidence on a missing
element is uncontroverted or clear and undisputed^ the appellate court would act as a
second jury in reviewing the evidence, and the Appellant's right to a fair jury trial on the
disputed element would be undermined. Hence, even if the failure to instruct on an
element is reviewed for prejudice, a conviction can be upheld only if the evidence on that
element is clear and undisputed or, in other words, uncontroverted.
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As set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 25-29, the evidence as to whether
Misty aided or abetted was disputed or controverted in this case, and the state
mischaracterizes the evidence when it argues that the "evidence of defendant's
accomplice liability was essentially uncontroverted at trial." State's brief at 16. In fact,
the state later recognizes that the evidence on this issue was controverted when it
indicates that Misty claimed that all she did was fail to tell on Chastity. State's brief at
17. Misty very clearly testified that Chastity took the Montero on her own, and that
Chastity's friend opened the door of the Eclipse and told Misty to get out. R. 97:101.
Misty's testimony also indicates that she was scared by Chastity and her friends, so she
got out. R. 97:101-02. Moreover, Misty testified that she did not encourage Chastity or
intentionally try to help her take the vehicles. R. 97:102. Since getting out of a car when
ordered to do so by someone who scares you fails to amount to aiding and abetting, the
testimony was controverted regarding the question of whether Misty's actions amounted
to aiding and abetting as a matter of law. Since the jury was never informed that it must
find that Misty "solicited], requested], commanded], encourage[d], or intentionally
aid[ed] another" or what that terminology meant as a matter of law, the jury did not
necessarily find under these facts that Misty's actions amounted to aiding and abetting.
The state attempts to confuse the issue by arguing that Chastity's role as a
principal actor was uncontroverted. State's brief at 15. The focus in this case, however,
is on Misty and whether she was an accomplice; even if the evidence of Chastity's role as
14

a principal was uncontroverted, the evidence regarding the extent of Misty's involvement
was controverted and, therefore, the failure to instruct on this element was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
POINT II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
MISTY.
The state's claim that Appellant failed to marshal the evidence is incorrect. State's
brief at 18. The marshaled evidence is listed on pages 29-30 of Appellant's opening brief
and labeled as the marshaled evidence in support of the conviction. Appellant recognized
that marshaled evidence in support of her argument (Appellant's opening brief at 30-32),
but argued that even when that marshaled evidence was considered, the evidence was not
sufficient to convict Misty.
There are two parts to Appellant's insufficient evidence claim. The state ignores
the first part of the claim. The first part of the claim is that the jury was instructed that
the element it must find beyond a reasonable doubt was that Misty "obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another." R. 36. There was absolutely no
evidence suggesting that Misty directly obtained the vehicle, and since that was the only
element submitted to the jury, the conviction must be overturned.
The state does not argue that there was any evidence to support the actus reus
element on which the jury was instructed. See state's brief at 18-20. Accordingly, the
conviction must be overturned for insufficient evidence.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Misty Segura respectfully requests that this Court reverse her
conviction and remand her case for a new trial based on the trial court's failure to
accurately instruct the jury on the elements. Alternatively, Appellant requests that this
Court reverse her conviction and dismiss the case based on insufficient evidence.
SUBMITTED this /Yt/t day of July, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

16

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State,
5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor,
P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this HH*. day of July, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of July, 2000.

17

